Another blow to the security certificate system
Posted: December 21, 2009 Filed under: Security Certificates | Tags: Federal Court, Security Certificates 2 Comments »While the Parliamentary inquiry into the treatment of Afghan detainees may be dominating the headlines, the government’s security certificate system received another blow last week when the Federal Court quashed the certificate against Toronto resident Hassan Almrei. The Syrian-born Almrei was arrested in 2001 after a security certificate was issued against him, and has been subject to its restrictions since. This is the second security certificate to be quashed in recent months; in September, Montreal resident Adil Charkaoui was cleared after the government failed to produce sufficient evidence in support of maintaining the certificate against him.
Justice Richard Mosley’s 183-page opinion is a fascinating read and highly critical of the government’s use of outdated information and poorly-substantiated allegations in order to maintain the certificate against Almrei. (Justice Mosley also filed a separate closed decision, which sets forth his analysis of facts that — due to their national security sensitivity — could not be divulged in a public decision. Justice Mosley’s references to his closed decision, however, suggest that it too is critical of the government’s evidence and use of unreliable information.)
In his decision, Justice Mosley acknowledged that Almrei “was at the very least an opportunist willing, for a suitable fee, to violate Canada’s laws”, observing that he:
lied and engaged in criminal activities prior to and following his entry to Canada. He maintained contacts with other Afghan Arab veterans, associated with persons who were believed to be Islamic extremists and made contact with others who were involved in human smuggling and the false document trade. He was prepared to assist others in obtaining those services and himself procured a false passport and other travel documents.
Based on this and other information quickly assembled by the government in the wake of the September 11 attacks, Justice Mosley “would have had no difficulty upholding” the certificate filed in 2001. What Justice Mosley found troubling was the government’s failure to subsequently verify the accuracy of the information it gathered in 2001, and its reliance on outdated and unreliable information in order to keep Almrei in detention.
The public summary of the “Security Intelligence Report” setting out the government’s evidence against Almrei was reviewed by expert witness Professor Brian Williams, who not only opined that the report “was not written by experts”, but appeared as if the authors had
went to Google with about two weeks notice and cobbled the material together.
The decision goes into significant detail criticizing the sources cited upon by the government (such as Wikipedia, among other internet sources of dubious reliability). The Court also criticizes the government’s selective use of testimony from human sources. In one example, a source who had provided “implausible” information incriminating Almrei in 2001 (when the source was “highly motivated to curry favour” with the government) subsequently provided another account in 2004 which tended to support Almrei’s evidence. However, in preparing the 2008 SIR, the government ignored the new evidence and chose to reiterate the 2001 account.
Accordingly, Justice Mosley found
it troubling that the work done to prepare the new SIR in 2008 had not kept pace with developments in the field. And the sources relied upon by the Service were often non-authoritative, misleading, or inaccurate. . . . [T]he SIR presented in 2008 simply recycled stale information without attempting to offer a more balanced and nuanced view.
Justice Mosley was also critical of the government’s “evidence” linking Almrei to Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, which consisted primarily of assertions that Almrei shared many of the same ideological views as members of Al Qaeda. As the Court observes:
As I understand the Ministers’ position, anyone who shares the principles of Al Qaeda and is in some way linked to it is a member of the Bin Laden network.
. . .
[However,] individuals and groups who have no connection with Al Qaeda cannot be said to be part of the network without some other indicia of membership such as willingness to follow directions from Bin Laden. It is not enough, in my view, to assert membership in an organization merely on the basis of a shared ideology. That is what I believe the Ministers have been attempting to do in this case. They can’t establish that Almrei is a member of Al Qaeda or an affliated organization and have attempted to bring him within the scope of this amorphous concept of a network based on his belief and participation in jihad.
An “unrestricted and broad” interpretation of organization does not encompass those who have expressed views that are sympathetic to the ideology of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda and approval of the actions they have taken. That is far too broad a net to cast and would be incompatible with the freedom of expression guaranteed by our Charter.
As a result, the Court found that the government had breached its duties of utmost good faith and candour with respect to Almrei:
The duties of utmost good faith and candour imply that the party relying upon the presentation of ex parte evidence will conduct a thorough review of the information in its possession and make representations based on all of the information including that which is unfavourable to their case. That was not done in this instance. The 2008 SIR was assembled with information that could only be construed as unfavourable to Almrei without any serious attempt to include information to the contrary, or to update their assessment. As [CSIS agent Robert] Young observed, in an unguarded moment, they thought that they had done their job in 2001 and there was no need to continue the investigation.
This decision is noteworthy in several respects. First, it highlights the crucial importance of access to the government’s evidence in these cases. It wasn’t until after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Charkaoui I (2007) and Charkaoui II (2008) that “special advocates” — security-cleared lawyers who are permitted to review classified and sensitive evidence on behalf of the individual subject to the security certificate — were appointed and that the government was required to retain and disclose all materials relevant to the security certificate, not just the information that bolstered the government’s case. Here, once the government was compelled to disclose its evidence and submit its witnesses to cross-examination by the special advocates, the weaknesses in its case against Almrei were exposed.
Second, this decision is important in what it didn’t do — opine on the constitutionality of the security certificate regime as a whole. (Keep in mind that under the special advocate system, certain sensitive evidence made available to the special advocate will not be made available to the subject of the security certificate himself because of “national security concerns”, which means that the individual with the best knowledge of the facts and the most at stake in the case cannot assist his counsel in examining the evidence.)
Because Justice Mosley found that Almrei’s certificate could be quashed based solely on the lack of sufficient evidence, he declined to determine whether the security certificate regime itself comports with the Charter. Nonetheless, without engaging a full-blown constitutional analysis, he makes the following observation in support of the status quo:
I think it is important to comment, however, on [Almrei's] argument that he was denied procedural fairness because of the lack of full disclosure. It is my view that the essential elements of the government’s allegations against Mr. Almrei were disclosed to him in these and the prior proceedings. Based on his testimony and the submissions made on his behalf, Mr. Almrei was clearly aware of the Ministers’ allegations against him. He was not given full disclosure of all of the closed information that supported the Ministers’ case, such as human source reports, but that was unavoidable in the circumstances.
In the Matter of Hassan Almrei (Federal Court decision)
ETA: Lawyers Weekly features an interview in this week’s edition with the public counsel and special advocates in the Almrei case, where they discuss the questionable constitutionality of the security certificate system and why, in this case, special advocates worked.
Security certificate quashed by court (The Lawyers Weekly)
Colvin’s rebuttal
Posted: December 16, 2009 Filed under: Afghan Detainee Hearings, Torture | Tags: afghanistan, canada, colvin, detainee hearings, Torture 1 Comment »This morning, Richard Colvin delivered a 16-page letter to the Special Committee on Afghanistan, setting out additional evidence and rebutting his government critics. The letter is worth reading in its entirety, but here are some of the highlights.

First, Colvin counters the assertion by government witnesses that they were “not told” of the risk of torture. He summarizes the contents of six memoranda written by Canadian diplomats in 2006 warning of detainee abuse and describes a March 2007 interagency meeting in Ottawa. According to Colvin, at this meeting, he informed 12 to 15 officials that:
“The NDS tortures people, that’s what they do, and if we don’t want our detainees tortured, we shouldn’t give them to the NDS.” (The NDS, or National Directorate of Security, is Afghanistan’s intelligence service.) The response from the Canadian note-taker was to stop writing and put down her pen.
He also details reports from the US State Department and the United Nations, confirming the systemic abuse of detainees in Afghanistan and use of torture by the NDS:
In other words, freely available documents from highly credible sources — including the United States Government and the United Nations — warned of “torture,” including specifically by the NDS.
(That is, Colvin is not merely a “Taliban dupe”, as some critics have suggested, unless the US State Department and the UN have been likewise duped.)
Colvin also challenges the idea that embassy reporting was based only on “second-hand” or “third-hand” evidence, noting that reports on detainees were based on information gathered from intelligence services, other embassies and diplomatic missions, and authoritative human rights bodies. He further remarked that:
Diplomats traffic in information. We seek out the most authoritative sources, build a relationship with those individuals, and report their information. . . . Information was cross-checked and triangulated.
Next, Colvin challenges the assertion made by witnesses that once the Canadian government was made aware of the risk of torture, steps were taken to prevent it from happening. Colvin bluntly states:
All of this information — internal reporting from Canadian officials in the field, reports from the US and interventions with policy-makers — had no visible impact on Canadian detainee practices. From February 2006 (when the Canadian battle group first deployed) to May 3, 2007 (when Canada signed a new Memorandum of Understanding on detainees that gave us the right to monitor) our detainees continued to be transferred to the NDS, despite a substantial risk of abuse or torture.
. . .
Even after the new MOU was signed, Ottawa for the first five months did not send a dedicated DFAIT monitor to conduct the monitoring. Monitoring in Kandahar was implemented by a rotating pool of officers, some on very short deployments. As a result, Canadian detainees in NDS custody in Kandahar remained at risk of torture. When a dedicated monitor was finally sent out in late October 2007, he quickly found conclusive evidence of continued torture. This finally triggered a Canadian decision to stop transfers.
With respect to the allegation that Taliban detainees are trained to claim torture, Colvin points out, as deputy Task Force Afghanistan commander Lt. Cl. Tom Putt did in his testimony before the Military Police Complaints Commission, that the Afghans detained by Canada were largely “local yokels” — not literate, highly educated international jihadists like al-Qaeda terrorists. According to Colvin, there is no Taliban equivalent to the al-Qaeda “Manchester manual”, which contained the instruction that upon capture, detainees should claim torture early and often. Colvin also points out that of the four detainees he interviewed, none first alleged torture.
Colvin rebuts the notion that Canadian forces had no option but to hand over detainees to the NDS, setting out at three other viable alternatives proposed by the embassy, but ultimately rejected by the government.
He sharply counters the government’s testimony that Ottawa encouraged full reporting and that embassy reports were not censored, providing detailed examples of incidents in which David Mulroney, Arif Lalani, and Colleen Swords gave instructions to limit reporting on information that “conflicted with the government’s public messaging.”
He also addresses issues concerning his credibility, why he has spoken up the way has, and how information is provided to ministers and generals.
All in all, a measured, compelling, and strong rebuke to the spin that the government and its witnesses have been putting on Colvin’s original testimony.
Richard Colvin’s December 16, 2009 Letter to the Special Committee on Afghanistan (available from the CBC)
Photo of the day: Empty chairs (UPDATED)
Posted: December 16, 2009 Filed under: Afghan Detainee Hearings, Torture | Tags: afghanistan, canada, detainee hearings, mackay, parliament, Torture Leave a comment »Conservative MPs boycotted the Tuesday emergency meeting of the parliamentary committee looking into allegations that Canadian Forces transferred Afghan detainees to torture. The seven Conservative MPs on the Committee left their chairs empty while Opposition MPs tried to figure out what had happened.
This latest stalling tactic comes amidst rumours that Prime Minister Harper may ask that Parliament be prorogued for the second time in two years. Along with killing all the bills before the House of Commons and Senate, a prorogue would have the convenient effect of shutting down the Committee until at least March, keeping Ministers out of the hot seat over the torture of Afghan detainees.
ETA: ‘Tis not the season to be investigating complicity in torture, it seems. The Tories are justifying their boycott thusly, according to the Globe and Mail:
The Tories defended their decision by saying there’s no urgency to hold more hearings in the holiday period.
“It’s not the time to be having meetings that are implying, intentioned or not, that Canadians are somehow guilty of war crimes,” [said] Laurie Hawn, the parliamentary secretary for the Defence Minister.
The Conservatives have, of course, been arguing against establishing a public Commission of Inquiry into detainee transfers, stating that the matter should be handled by the Special Committee. This boycott — and the Harper government’s refusal to provide unredacted copies of relevant documents to the Special Committee, despite a Parliamentary motion to do so — illustrates the emptiness of the government’s commitment to determining whether Canada is knowingly complicit in torture. And this is precisely why we need a public Commission of Inquiry immediately.
Canada’s disregard for human rights in Afghanistan
Posted: December 14, 2009 Filed under: Afghan Detainee Hearings, Torture | Tags: afghanistan, canada, colvin, detainee hearings, mackay, Murray Brewster, redacted, Torture Leave a comment »Murray Brewster at the Canadian Press has obtained access to uncensored copies of diplomatic memoranda stating that Canadian officials continued to support Asadullah Khalid, the former governor of Kandahar, despite repeated warnings that he was a “known human-rights abuser”.
From Sunday’s article:
The revelation about Asadullah Khalid, who stayed on as governor two years after concerns about his notorious reputation were raised, opens up another embarrassing avenue of inquiry over Afghan prisoner abuse.
The new allegation is contained in a two-year-old end-of-mission report by Richard Colvin, the whistleblower foreign service officer. An uncensored version of the report was shown for the first time to The Canadian Press.
Colvin’s disgust that Canada would support a “known human-rights abuser” was palpable and formed the most incendiary paragraphs of the report. References to Khalid were entirely blacked out in the version of the report publicly released to the Military Police Complaints Commission.
The article is available in full here.
Recently, Brewster reported on other unreleased documents detailing Canada’s troubling conduct with respect to Afghan detainees.
In this article, Brewster reports on an unreleased 2009 memo stating that the Afghan secret police — itself notorious for its blatant disregard for human rights — “refused to accept Canadian-captured prisoners over the summer because the military was providing ‘insufficient evidence’ of wrongdoing.”
And last week, Brewster reported on secret memos showing that Canadian officials were not only warned of detainee torture as early as 2006, but were preparing public responses at that time, should the allegations of abuse come to light.
Canada defended Afghan ‘human-rights abuser,’ memos allege (The Canadian Press)
Afghans rejected Canadian-captured prisoners for ‘insufficient evidence’ (The Canadian Press)
Calls for MacKay’s resignation over Afghan prisoner furor (The Canadian Press)
ETA: MacKay responds to these allegations
What’s behind the black boxes?
Posted: December 11, 2009 Filed under: Afghan Detainee Hearings, Torture | Tags: abuse, afghanistan, canada, detainee hearings, documents, Natynczyk, redacted, Torture Leave a comment »Aaron Wherry over at MacLean’s was sharp enough to spot the difference between the version of a report cited by General Walter Natynczyk in his press conference on Wednesday morning and the version provided to the BCCLA and Amnesty back in 2007.
The difference? The report of a prisoner transferred by Canadian Forces to Afghan police being abused by Afghan forces was redacted in the version the BCCLA and Amnesty got to see.
In the version provided to the BCCLA (right), critical pieces of evidence have been redacted, hiding the suggestion that abuse by the ANP was well known to Canadian Forces.
Here’s a transcribed version of the unredacted document, as provided by the CBC. I’ve noted the sections that were redacted in the version provided to the BCCLA and Amnesty in bold:
20:00 14 Jun 06 [location redacted]
Stopped along Rte [redacted] and held up a vehicle that was proceeding south down the route. Stopped and searched the three individuals in the white van and got a very weird feel from one of them. Had the terp [interpreter] come and he [unclear] that the individual was in an probability Enemy (Taliban) due to his accent and his false story of being from Kandahar City. So I had him lie down on his stomach, then conducted a detailed search (I had him empty his pockets prior to this) catalogued all his items and then took down his particulars (name [redacted] from Uruzgan). We then photographed the individual prior to handing him over, to ensure that if the ANP did assault him, as has happened in the past, we would have a visual record of his condition. The ANP Section Comd, [redacted] then arrived, asked the suspect a couple of questions and concurred with our assessment that the individual was enemy. We in good faith handed the PUC (person under control) over to them so that he could be transported to the Zhari District Center [Forward Operating Base Wilson] where [watchdog] (a radio call-sign for military police) could get him. That was the last I saw him. [redacted] is one of [redacted] men.
Wonder what else is behind black boxes on the documents the government has disclosed so far? So does Parliament. Today the opposition parties teamed up to pass an unusual motion that may force the government to produce uncensored versions of many critical documents relating to prisoner transfers and reports of torture or abuse. The government is expected to ignore the motion, triggering a battle between national security privilege and parliamentary privilege that could wind up in the courts.
Torture hearings liveblog: Peter MacKay
Posted: December 9, 2009 Filed under: Afghan Detainee Hearings, Torture | Tags: afghanistan, canada, detainee hearings, mackay, Torture 3 Comments »Today is the last session of the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan before Parliament closes shop for the year. It promises to be an explosive day of testimony, as key government figures will be appearing, including the embattled Minister of National Defense, Peter MacKay.
MacKay’s repeated assertions that there have been no substantiated cases of transferred detainees being tortured or abused were challenged earlier today by Chief of the Defence Staff Walter Natynczyk. Natynczyk had backed up MacKay’s denials in his appearance before the committee but changed his story in a dramatic press conference this morning. The BCCLA’s thoughts on Natynczyk’s reversal are available here.
The video stream of the proceedings will be available on ParlVU when the committee meets at 12:30 Pacific time, 3:30 Eastern. We’ll also be live blogging our thoughts on the proceedings here, and posting a full summary later this evening.
—
LIVEBLOG
- 2:22 – Meeting adjourned before an answer can be given.
- 2:20 – Claude Bachand - I would like to be able to get answers about responsibility to know. What do you have to say about ministerial responsibility to know. Where is the ministerial responsibility?
- 2:19 – MacKay – We’re concerned with detainees that we had taken in the field and then turned over. Hundreds of allegations are of great concern, but our focus and responsibility is on the prisoners that we’ve turned over.
- 2:19 – Lalond – Were you or were you not aware of IAHRC’s report detailing torture in Afghan prisons?
- 2:17 – MacKay – Cites Colleen Swords testimony – DFAIT became aware of ICRC being concerned about notification of transfers and over capacity. We took action. By Feb 2007 we had experts on the ground to increase capabilities and capacities of Afghan prisons.
- 2:15 – O’Connor – We inherited a bad transfer agreement. We upgraded the agreement.
- 2:13 - Francine Lalond, questions for O’Connor – Ministers have a responsibility to know things, not just to receive but to be informed. Were you aware of report prepared by IAHRC dealing with 398 prisoners that were tortured, 57 of them who were from Kandahar? Do you have responsibility to know about these things?
- 2:10 – MacKay – Outrageous allegations that we would knowingly collude in sending anyone to torture. Completely without basis or proof that MacKay has personally withheld documents or evidence. MPCC chair made a choice to suspend hearings.
- 2:09 – Dosanjh – International law – you don’t need actual knowledge of torture or specific allegations, just circumstantial evidence and overall risks. You had this but continued transfers. MPCC is sufficient? No, it has been obstructed. Frustrated committee by not providing disclosure. “You allowed our prisoners to be sent to torture, despite substantial knowledge of the risk of torture.”
- 2:07 – MacKay – Ministers get information from deputies, etc. Information flows up through government departments to a minister for a decision. This is synthesized from many sources, seen through sources of diplomats and military. Some information we’ve heard came from emails sent in. Ministers’ inboxes receive thousands of emails brought forward for decision.
- 2:06 – Dosanjh interrupts, speaker turns off mic.
- 2:04 – MacKay – Discusses improvements in the new agreement. We didn’t deny general concerns, but when there were specific concerns, they were investigated.
- 2:04 – Ujjal Dosanjh, question for MacKay – Asks for MacKay to step down.
- 2:02 – Questions beginning.
- 1:59 – “If I were asked to pick between a Corrections Canada Officer and an al-Qaeda tactic, I would pick Corrections Canada ten times out of ten” re: prisoners complaining of abuse.
- 1:56 – “Can we shoulder responsibility for everything that happens in Afghan prisons? Of course not.”
- 1:53 – Wonders why people are “fixated on the wellbeing of individuals who are suspected of being our enemies in this conflict” and to remember our own troops’ sacrifices… many detainees “had Canadian blood on their hands”
- 1:48 – Hon. Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Foreign Affairs making opening statements
- 1:47 – (Ed.- Is it really called the “Taliban prisoner transfer regime” or is that just a MacKayism?)
- 1:45 – MPCC currently investigating detainee transfers. Federal Court has limited their jurisdiction, so it should resume soon.
- 1:44 – Re: Colvin comments – Says at least seven witnesses say there is insufficient evidence to back up claims that were made. Not personal, and have never said “Taliban dupe”.
- 1:43 – Careful review of information disclosed, vetted by all departments involved. Well-established procedure, free from political interference. Has been reviewed by Federal Court.
- 1:43 – Must also protect relationships with partners in Afghanistan.
- 1:42 – Have been concerns with disclosure, but gov has critical obligation to insure that lives of Canadians are not put at additional risk by the potential release of information that may be of an operational security nature.
- 1:41 – Hon. Minister of National Defence Peter Mackay resuming opening statement.
- 1:40 – Meeting called back to order.
- 1:30 – Hearing still suspended. Will they extend the hearings past 3:30 or will time for questions be cut in half?
- 12:56 – Hearing suspended for vote in House of Commons
- 12:54 – Must rely on Afghans to meet their commitments, but must be sure that we are not transferring into a substantial risk of abuse, and that’s what we did.
- 12:53 – Took allegations of abuse seriously and acted appropriately. Worked to make sure Afghan authorities were aware of Canada’s expectations. Reminds committee that Afghanistan is a sovereign nation.
- 12:52 – Made new agreement because of concerns over prisoners’ conditions. Designed to enhance ability to meet obligations, both by Canada and Afghanistan.
- 12:51 – Received information from a wide variety of sources. Considered information and used it to see how the arrangement could be improved. This led to May 2007 Supplementary Arrangement.
- 12:51 – Received assurances from Afghan government that prisoners would be treated humanely.
- 12:49 – Canada’s practices grounded in international law – laws of armed conflict, Geneva Convention.
- 12:46 – It’s a difficult and dangerous mission. (Ed.- Yes, but what does that have to do with Canada’s obligations to prevent torture?)
- 12:46 – Says Canada has never been complicit in torture or willfully blind to abuse, no one ever turned a blind eye
- 12:45 - Hon. Peter Gordon MacKay, Minister of National Defence making opening statements
- 12:44 – No abuse by Canadians, no condoning of abuse by Afghanis.
- 12:42 – During visits never heard allegations of torture, never read reports from Colvin.
- 12:40 – Says accusations of a coverup are “irresponsible”.
- 12:39 – NATO recommended handing over prisoners within 96 hours of capture, “during my time as Minister I do not recall ever being advised of any abuse or torture of prisoners by Canadian Forces or any abuse or torture of prisoners they handed over”
- 12:38 – O’Connor describing tactics used by Taliban – IEDs, etc.
- 12:37 – Hon. Gordon O’Connor, Minister of State and Chief Government Whip making opening statements
- 12:14 – Waiting for the hearings to begin. Check back in 15 minutes.
Canadian Forces’ U-Turn: Detainee was abused
Posted: December 9, 2009 Filed under: Afghan Detainee Hearings, Torture | Tags: afghanistan, canada, detainee hearings, mackay, Natynczyk, Torture 1 Comment »It’s interesting that General Walter Natynczyk wasn’t briefed on the case that the BCCLA and Amnesty International launched against the Canadian Forces in 2007. If he had been, he wouldn’t have been compelled to call a news conference today to correct false information he gave to the Commons committee on Tuesday.
Yesterday, the top military commander denied that there was evidence that a detainee who was beaten by Afghan police was handed over to Afghans by Canadian troops in 2006. Today, Natynczyk did a complete about-face and admitted that the man was indeed captured by Canadian troops. Natynczyk’s embarrassing turnaround is the lead story today in the Globe.
Our litigation uncovered information related to the transfer of the beaten Afghan man in 2007. Colonel Stephen Noonan told us about the existence of the man. Noonan stated in his affidavit filed in the litigation:
There was one incident in which the CF took custody of [sic] detainee who had been turned over to the local ANP by the CF. In this case, the CF learned that the detainee had been beaten by the local ANP. When they learned of this, they approached the local ANP and requested that the detainee be given to them. The ANP complied and the CH subsequently transferred the detainee to the Provincial ANP.
Documents we received after Noonan filed his affidavit reaffirmed that the detainee Noonan referred to had been captured by the Canadian Forces – and that the transfer occurred before Canada and Afghanistan entered into the second agreement. The documents revealed that when the Canadian Forces examined the man, they discovered “a large contusion, cause from blunt force trauma to the back of his neck and shoulder contusions/abrasions on the upper back”. “Further examination revealed apparent shoe prints on the back of his vest/clothes. These marks were consistent with his reports…of being beaten with shoes.”
Our lawyer, Paul Champ, cross-examined Brigadier General Joseph Deschamps on this very issue. See the transcript from our lawsuit at para. 81.
Finally the Canadian Forces are waking up to the information that has been right in front of them for years. Who knows, maybe they’ll even get around to reading those pesky human rights reports.
Proof of detainee abuse
Posted: December 7, 2009 Filed under: Afghan Detainee Hearings, Torture | Tags: afghanistan, canada, detainee hearings, documents, Torture Leave a comment »Today, the Globe and Mail’s Paul Koring reported on evidence contradicting Defence Minister Peter MacKay’s repeated assertions that there has never been proof that Canadian-transferred detainees were abused by Afghan security forces. This evidence was uncovered during the federal court challenge the BCCLA launched with Amnesty International.
From the Globe and Mail:
In one well-documented case in the summer of 2006, Canadian soldiers captured and handed over a detainee who was so severely beaten by Afghan police that the Canadians intervened and took the detainee back. Canadian medics then treated the man’s injuries. The incident is documented in the field notes of Canadian troops, recounted in a sworn affidavit by a senior officer and confirmed in cross-examination by a general.
The incident, which was previously known, takes on new and greater significance given the chorus of denials from Mr. MacKay.
The Globe and Mail also has a tidy round-up of MacKay’s repeated denials of detainee abuse.
Proof of detainee abuse exists, despite MacKay’s denials (Globe and Mail)
Verbatim: MacKay on detainees (Globe and Mail)
Reactions to December 2, 2009 Afghan Detainee Hearings
Posted: December 3, 2009 Filed under: Afghan Detainee Hearings, Torture | Tags: afghanistan, canada, colvin, detainee hearings, Torture Leave a comment »Yesterday, government witnesses continued to toe the party line, asserting that there was no credible evidence of torture prior to the May 2007 transfer arrangement. In light of the reports which were being issued by authoritative and credible human rights observers about the serious risk of torture faced by detainees in Afghan custody, it is difficult to understand how the government can maintain this position.
Colleen Swords, an assistant deputy minister at Foreign Affairs, who was also a government witness during our federal court challenge to the Afghan detainee transfers, testified yesterday that for her, credible evidence of torture meant specific evidence that the individual detainee being transferred would be tortured by Afghan authorities.
Liberal MP Bob Rae asked Ms. Swords: “”If you find an instrument of torture in the office of the director of investigations of the national directorate of security, what is that?” he asked Swords.
She responded that the “standard is a substantial risk of torture, and it has to be with respect to the individual, not just generally.”
Ms. Swords statement is a shocking misunderstanding of Canada’s obligations under international and domestic law. It strikes us as incredible that a senior diplomatic official responsible preventing the mistreatment of Canadian transferred detainees was not better briefed on the relevant legal standards concerning the universal prohibition against torture.
Canada’s international treaty obligations impose upon it a positive obligation to prevent acts of torture. The principle of non-refoulement is a fundamental and inherent component of the prohibition against torture, and is enshrined in Canada’s domestic laws and in international human rights instruments to which Canada is a signatory. Under the principle of non-refoulement, Canada cannot transfer an individual to another country if he or she would be at risk of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment there.
In order to demonstrate that an individual would be at risk of torture or abuse, it is not necessary to show with certainty that an individual would be tortured or abused. (It is, of course, impossible to predict the future with certainty.) All that is needed is a showing that there is a substantial risk that the individual being transferred would be subjected to torture or abuse.
There are a number of ways in which substantial risk of torture can be demonstrated. One way is to present credible evidence that individuals in certain groups are targeted for torture, and to establish that the individual being transferred is a member of that targeted group. This is precisely the evidence we have here — that detainees in Afghan prison are routinely tortured, and that the individuals being transferred by Canadian forces would necessarily be detainees in Afghan prisons. This is sufficient to trigger Canada’s obligations to refrain from transferring individuals under the principle of non-refoulement.
The Canadian government’s assertion that it needed specific evidence of the torture of an individual transferred by Canadian Forces before it was required to halt the detainee transfers mischaracterizes its obligations under the law.
Richard Colvin Documents
Posted: December 3, 2009 Filed under: Afghan Detainee Hearings, Torture | Tags: afghanistan, canada, colvin, detainee hearings, documents, Torture 2 Comments »Welcome to the BCCLA’s National Security blog. Right now, we’re tracking the Afghan detainee hearings in Parliament and will be providing commentary and updates as testimony progresses.
Today, documents that support Mr. Richard Colvin’s testimony are being made publicly available for the first time by the BCCLA and Amnesty International.
Mr. Colvin, a senior diplomat who was stationed in Afghanistan, recently testified before a parliamentary committee that Canadian officials at the highest levels of seniority were made aware of serious concerns that Afghan prisoners were being subjected to torture and other human rights violations.
Prior to his testimony before Parliament, Mr. Colvin was called as witness before the Military Police Complaints Commission. The documents that are being released today were originally released to the Military Police Complaints Commission after being heavily censored by the Canadian government.
The BCCLA and Amnesty received those documents on November 23, 2009, but confidentiality agreements prevented the BCCLA and Amnesty from making the documents public. Those confidentiality agreements were lifted today, so the BCCLA and Amnesty are making those censored documents available to the public in their entirety.
The documents contain a series of 2006-2007 email correspondences and reports shared between officials involved in the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. They discuss detainee transfer agreements and the possibility that detainees transferred by Canadian Forces could be tortured by Afghan police.
The BCCLA and Amnesty are shocked that many of Mr. Colvin’s documents were not disclosed during the course of the lawsuits our organizations launched in 2007 and 2008. The government failed to disclose these documents despite the fact that they were obviously of direct relevance to the issues before the court and were certainly covered by requests for disclosure of documents that were made by our legal team. There is a legal duty for parties to disclose such documents, and the failure to disclose these documents raises serious questions about whether the government met their legal obligations.
The documents focus on inadequate tracking mechanisms that sometimes lost track of transferred detainees, and Richard Colvin’s concerns that Canadian Forces were sending detainees into almost certain torture at the hand of Afghan police.
The messages from Mr. Colvin became increasingly blunt as the severity of the situation and the government’s failure to address the situation became clear. He summed it up best in an email dated October 24, 2007:
“There seems to be a continued reluctance to acknowledge the scope or severity of the detainee problem, instead claiming that the “alleged” abuse is a Taliban fabrication or stressing fictitious ‘Afghan investigations.’ Our systemic failure to operationalize our human-rights rhetoric runs contrary to Canadian values and interests, and has needlessly damaged public support for the Afghan deployment.”
The documents are available online here.
To learn more about the BCCLA’s work on Afghan detainee issues and how you can help in the fight against torture, please visit our Afghan detainee section.









