Omar Khadr: Waiting for answers
Posted: October 29, 2010 Filed under: GTMO, Torture | Tags: canada, charter, GTMO, guantanamo, khadr, Torture, united states, us 1 Comment »The BCCLA National Security team has covered Omar Khadr’s continuing ordeal extensively over the past year, from Canadian courts to Guantanamo Bay. After weeks of rumours and speculation, the Guantanamo show trial will finally wrap up. Omar Khadr has pled guilty.

The fix had been in for years. No matter what, Khadr was likely going to be found guilty. He would be guilty of crimes that probably are not crimes outside of Guantanamo on the basis of evidence that would not be allowed as evidence outside of Guantanamo.
Khadr was 15 when he was first detained. He is now 24, and has been held in Guantanamo for over one third of his young life. With the guilty plea, he chose to get out of Guantanamo, maybe even return to Canada, before he turns 40. He may get to have an adult life. Without the guilty plea, he would have been kept in Guantanamo for a lot longer, at least until he was an old man, and perhaps until he died.
The military tribunal is not concluded, but has instead moved to a sentencing phase. The jury will come to a sentence to compare against the one in the plea agreement, and Mr. Khadr will serve the lower of the two.
So far, that sentencing phase has been an ugly spectacle. Perhaps the lowest moment came when an anti-Muslim psychologist gave evidence that, even if Mr. Khadr was not a threat when he was first brought into Guantanamo, he had spent years “marinating in a radical jihadist community” in the prison and had become too dangerous to be released.
While the tribunal may be winding down, this is not the end of the Khadr story. We are still not sure exactly what he has pleaded guilty to. We are not sure where he will serve his sentence, or how long that sentence will be. We are not sure what actions the Government of Canada will take to remedy his Charter rights, as required by the Supreme Court of Canada. So far Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon has continued to do what he has done all along—nothing at all.
What we are sure of is that almost everyone—the Government of Canada, the United States, his own parents—have failed Mr. Khadr terribly. History will not judge us kindly.
Today at the MPCC: Torture is a “real conversation killer”
Posted: September 9, 2010 Filed under: Afghan Detainee Hearings, Torture | Tags: afghanistan, canada, colvin, detainee hearings, mpcc, paul champ, Torture Leave a comment »After a long summer hiatus, the Afghan Public Interest Hearings at the Military Police Complaints Commission resumed today, with Major General Mike Ward of the Canadian Forces taking the stand to discuss the transfer of detainees to Afghan security forces during his tenure as Chief of Staff: Operations (CoS) at CEFCOM, the Ottawa-based office heading the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. He was CoS from 2005 until 2006, a time when Canada’s detainee policy was not yet under the heavy scrutiny it has seen over the past three years.
MGen Ward’s testimony continued to develop what is an increasingly clear picture of CEFCOM leadership and Ottawa bureaucrats ignoring the realities on the ground in Afghanistan.
MGen Mike Ward & LGen Sayed Mohammad Qudossi at Afghan Police Academy, January 2010. Image: Canwest
He called the National Directorate of Security (NDS), the Afghan intelligence organization that receives Canada’s transferred detainees, a “very highly thought of organization“, neverminding the fact that torture by the NDS has been well documented. Reports from independent observers like Human Rights Watch and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the U.S. State Department, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), and even Canada’s own Foreign Service have all confirmed abuse in NDS facilities.
He also showed a lack of understanding of Canada’s international obligations. MGen Ward said that he was not hearing more reports of torture out of Afghanistan than he was from the other regions that Canadian Forces were involved in, but also admitted that he could not “dismiss the fact torture happened“, but that we could not “assume that’s the case all the time”.
Under international law, Canada cannot transfer detainees to a risk of torture, full stop. The standard is not “to a risk greater than that in other countries”, or “to a certainty of torture”. It’s not good enough to say that the system is working because not every transferred detainee is tortured. The “fact that torture happened”, as MGen Ward put it, means that transfers should not have happened at all, not until Canada was satisfied that there was no longer a substantial risk of torture.
MGen Ward also dismissed concerns over detainee transfers from CEFCOM’s Provost Marshal at the time, Major Kevin Rowcliffe. Maj Rowcliffe had told MPCC investigators that his superiors had ignored his attempts to express his concerns over detainee transfers. MGen Ward did not remember having a conversation with Maj Rowcliffe about detainees, but said that his comments were “outside the lane” because Canadian Forces already had enough to worry about without adding concerns over detainees into the mix. He also said that at CEFCOM, people had other things on their mind, and that talk about detainee abuse was a “conversation killer at the water cooler”.
In the end, it became clear that MGen Ward just did not want to think about detainees. He knew that some detainees were tortured and that the Canadian Forces transfer regime did little to prevent it, but just didn’t want to be the one to dampen the mood at CEFCOM with that depressing water cooler talk about torture.
This week at the MPCC
Posted: May 10, 2010 Filed under: Afghan Detainee Hearings, Parliament, Torture | Tags: afghanistan, canada, carmen cheung, detainee hearings, detainees, dfait, mpcc, parliament, Torture Leave a comment »The Afghanistan Public Interest Hearings at the Military Police Complaints Commission continue this week before a month-long break while the Commission waits for the government to make the required document disclosures. BCCLA Counsel Carmen Cheung is in Ottawa again this week for the hearings.
On Tuesday, May 11, the MPCC will hear from Brigadier-General Guy Laroche, Commander of the Task Force in Afghanistan from November 2007 to May 2008. BGen Laroche was Commander in Afghanistan when detainee transfers were suspended in November 2007.
On November 25, 2007, he wrote to LGen Gauthier, Commander CEFCOM, about the suspension of transfers. He complained that his command was not being provided with adequate information on post-transfer monitoring visits, and that the findings of investigations into previous allegations of abuse were not being sent to him. Transfers were suspended in part because of credible allegations of torture in a November 5, 2007 report from Nicolas Gosselin, but largely because the Commander did not have enough information to satisfy the legal test for transfers.
Ed Jager, policy advisor with DFAIT, is scheduled to appear on Wednesday, May 12. Mr. Jager was not originally scheduled to appear before the MPCC, but he was called to appear after controversial testimony by Ahmadshah “Pacha” Malgarai before parliamentary committee in April. Pacha was a language and cultural advisor to the former Task Force Commander. He made two shocking claims regarding Mr. Jager.
Pacha suggested that during a detainee transfer, an NDS officer put his pistol on a table and told Mr. Jager to kill the detainee rather than transfer him. In an unrelated incident, the same NDS officer made thinly veiled threats to torture a detainee who was about to be transferred. He told Mr. Jager that when the detainee “gets to my room, he will speak.”
After these two witnesses, the MPCC will break until June 14, when BGen Laroche’s second in command, Colonel Christian Juneau, is scheduled to appear. Col Juneau was Acting Commander when transfers were suspended, and sent a letter to LGen Gauthier and other senior officials outlining his concerns about the lack of information flowing from CEFCOM and information regarding the credible allegations of torture contained in Mr. Gosselin’s November 5 report. Among the recipients of that letter were Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier and Defence Minister Peter MacKay.
The month-long break at the MPCC comes just as a new poll indicates that Canadians are upset about the Afghan detainee issue. From the National Post:
Almost eight in 10 surveyed said that, assuming transferred detainees were tortured by the Afghan authorities, the actions are “wrong, and once known should have stopped.”
…
More than half — 52% — said they believe Prime Minister Stephen Harper knew what was going on, and the same percentage said they believe individual soldiers knew it was happening, according to the poll.
However, a much larger majority — 75% — said they believe senior Canadian military officials would have known that transferred prisoners were being tortured. Sixty-five per cent said they believe the minister of defence had to have known, and 66% said they believe the Defence or Foreign Affairs Department were in the know.
It’s interesting to note that Canadians aren’t placing the blame for transfers to torture on the heads of the soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan. The poll found that 93% of Canadians “are proud of the men and women serving in the armed forces, the highest rating ever recorded by the polling firm”. Instead, Canadians place the blame firmly on the government and the commanders:
Canadians see the story as a “chain-of-command issue” where responsibility rests at the top, and not with individual soldiers, said Mr. Wright, senior vice-president of Ipsos Reid.
…
A majority said that if it is determined that officials knew as far back as 2007 that torture was taking place and didn’t do anything to stop it, or denied it was happening at all, then top bosses should be ousted from their jobs.
Those same top bosses are the ones taking their time to make sure that documents are “good and ready” before the MPCC can see them.
CBSA laptop search documents
Posted: May 3, 2010 Filed under: Borders, Laptop Searches, Security | Tags: canada, cbsa, laptops, privacy, search 5 Comments »In late February, shortly after the story we posted about the Canada Border Services Agency delaying our request for documents on their policies on searching laptops and other personal electronics, a slim brown envelope arrived in our office. The response came just over two weeks after the extended deadline the CBSA set for itself had expired. The delay was frustrating, but not nearly as long as we’d feared given the abysmal state of access to information responses from other governmental agencies.
Now that we’ve had a chance to go through the documents, there were few surprises. The documents provided by the CBSA were disorganized and still fail to provide a clear and complete picture of CBSA policies and practices on data search and retention. In the end, the documents raised more questions than they answered, but are fairly interesting in their own right, if only for the glimpse into the institutional culture of the CBSA they can provide.
Many categories of important information were completely redacted or exempted from disclosure. Some of the redactions were legitimate—legal opinions, for instance, would generally be covered by solicitor-client privilege. Other omissions were less convincing, and the practice of redacting in white rather than in black left it unclear whether information was missing or not. Some areas of the request were completely ignored or omitted. For instance, we asked for statistics on how many searches of personal electronics had been conducted. These statistics were not even referred to in the documents provided.
The BCCLA has filed another complaint with the Office of the Information Commissioner, this time regarding the exemptions and redactions from the documents provided by the CBSA in response to our request. For now, here’s a review of some of the highlights of the documents we have received:
The consistent:
- CBSA policy states that “the difference between a paper document and information stored electronically is only the medium it is stored on” (A-2009-01850-Vol2 on p. 5). We can think of lots of other differences—the kind and quantity of information that is regularly brought across the border by travellers bringing their laptops and smart phones, for instance—but this fits with what we had learned about CBSA search practices.
- The CBSA spends a lot of time thinking about child pornography. We’d always assumed this was the case, but the documents show that an entire chapter of the Customs Enforcement Manual is dedicated to the subject (A-2009-01850-Vol4).
- The CBSA can and does perform laptop searches at random, but “will only scan or peruse a document to the extent necessary to either confirm or negate its association to an offence or intelligence concern” (A-2009-01850-Vol2 on p. 2).
- Most screening is not at random, relying instead on various “indicators” including “known importers, exporters, known export locations (specific locations or geographical areas), the nature of the goods being imported (commodities known to be suspect) and/or information disseminated through regional or headquarters intelligence channels. … Officers should also be aware of high-risk geographical locations for child sex tourism” (A-2009-01850-Vol4 at p. 6). Specific indicators and suspect nations were redacted from the documents CBSA provided us. However, from court documents filed in the case of former Bishop Raymond Lahey, we know that “border officials flagged Lahey because he was a man travelling alone and his passport showed several trips to Southeast Asia, Germany, Spain and other areas known for child pornography”.
- Screening also relies on various databases, including the Integrated Primary Inspection Line system (IPIL) and Integrated Customs Enforcement System (ICES) for primary screening, and Field Operations Support System (FOSS), the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC), National Crime Information Center (NCIC), the sex offender database, Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS), and Police Information Records System for secondary screening (PIRS) (A-2009-01850-Vol6 on p. 14).
- The “Electronic Media Search Form” sets out a lot of what CBSA officers are looking for when they decide to search a computer. Officers will look for user accounts visible on the login screen, note the operating system, any encryption, and provides space for passwords provided, but also a box for “password not located”. There are also suggested image and keyword searches to guide officers (A-2009-01850-Vol6 on p. 6-8).

- The CBSA has software to assist border agents with laptop searches. If, after an initial search, the border agent feels further scrutiny is required, he or she uses software called ICWhatUC to scan images stored on the traveller’s hard drive. ICWhatUC only works on Windows machines. It scans for image files on a computer, including images in the web browser’s cache, image files with strange file extensions (like .doc instead of .jpg) and files in the recycle bin. Deleted files and files in archives do not show up. We’ve purchased a copy of the law enforcement version of ICWhatUC and will be doing an analysis of its capabilities and limitations in another post this month.

The weird:
A Powerpoint presentation illustrates the physical size of media that it is possible to store on media of various capacities. For instance, “one meter (or close to a yard) of shelved books” is about 100 megabytes, while a “pickup truck filled with books” is about 500 megabytes of data (A-2009-01850-Vol7 on p. 4). A USB key could “contain a stack of paper (8.5×11), 35 feet higher than the CN tower” that “would take two years to print @ 24/7″ (A-2009-01850-Vol7 on p. 1).- Another bizarre Powerpoint charts porn vs. time, showing that every second $3075 is spent on pornography, 28258 internet users are viewing pornography, and 372 people are typing adult search terms into search engines (A-2009-01850-Vol7 on p. 3). It follows this information up with statistics on youth viewing pornography, and then directly to statistics on seizures of child pornography (p. 4). This disingenuous attempt to link legal, adult pornography with the production and distribution of child pornography in its training materials may be part of the reason for CBSA’s continued targeting of legal materials it finds objectionable, like artsy queer films.
- A chart breaks down the difference between “child pornography” and “not child pornography”, in case there was any confusion (A-2009-01850-Vol4 on p. 16). This chart seems to be common sense, but given some of the ridiculous accusations that have been made in the past, it’s probably a good thing that CBSA agents are provided with this handy cheat sheet:

A later document notes another example: “Japanese Anime – most not child porn” (A-2009-01850-Vol6 on p. 13).
The missing:
Five key areas were not addressed adequately (or at all) in the CBSA’s response to our request:
- Criteria for selection of individuals for device inspection. Information was referred to, and some information provided, but the contents of these sections were heavily redacted.
- Policies for copying and retention of electronic information. Some information was provided, but it only referred to cases where potentially criminal conduct was detected during the CBSA’s initial search. Further information is required here.
- Statistics on the number and kinds of devices inspected.
- Demographic information on individuals whose devices have been inspected.
- Policies for the distribution of electronic information copied from electronic devices to other government agencies.
These areas make up the substance of our second complaint to the Information Commissioner.
Overall, the CBSA’s lack of transparency on this important issue is discouraging. While their policies on searches appear to be quite similar, the CBSA has not been as forthcoming with information as even the secretive U.S. Department of Homeland Security, which has made its policy publicly available.
The documents:
As promised, we’ve made all the documents we received available online. Download them and have a look through them yourself. If you see anything of special note, have your own story of having your electronics searched at the Canadian border, or have something to add, please let us know in the comments or by email: [greg]@[bccla].[org]
Databases: We’ll show you ours if you show us yours
Posted: April 28, 2010 Filed under: Borders, No Fly List, Security | Tags: canada, cbsa, no fly list, no-fly, privacy, secure flight, Security 1 Comment »The Afghan detainee file has been taking up a lot of our time lately, but the BCCLA national security team hasn’t dropped the ball on other issues.
One area we’ve been watching is transnational data sharing, especially between Canada and the United States. Canada and the U.S. have been sharing police records since the Reagan era, and the relationship has only become cozier since 2001. An article in the USA Today illustrates just how close that relationship has become:
Thousands of times each day, Canadian authorities tap into sensitive U.S. government databases to check the criminal histories of U.S. citizens who are crossing the border or have been entangled in the Canadian criminal justice system, FBI records show.
…
During the Winter Olympics, Canadian authorities ran nearly 10,000 criminal history checks per day, more inquiries than some U.S. states perform each day, FBI records show.
Even more Canadian citizens receive similar scrutiny by U.S. officials with access to Canadian records, according to RCMP records. Since January, Canada has conducted 400,000 queries and the U.S., 1.4 million.
Systems used that widely have a gross potential for abuse. We wouldn’t just trust another nation to troll through our most sensitive records, would we? There must be some oversight built into the system, right? Wrong:
The U.S. has no independent authority to audit Canada’s use, Weise says, and Canada has no authority to police U.S. queries of its system. Weise and RCMP Sgt. Greg Cox say the two countries conduct regular internal audits of their own use.
Well, if it’s widely used and there’s absolutely no accountability, we shouldn’t be worried if we’ve nothing to hide, right? Wrong again:
Canada’s access to such detailed — and possibly outdated — personal histories of U.S. citizens, including decades-old misdemeanors, can result in wrongful detention, interrogation and foreign travel bans.
About half of the arrest records in the system have not been updated to reflect convictions, dismissals or acquittals, Weise said, adding that local law enforcement agencies are responsible for giving the FBI updated information.
So to sum up: Border agents in Canada and the United States have unlimited access to the other country’s criminal databases. There are no checks and balances to ensure that U.S. use of the Canadian system is appropriate, and vice versa. Even if our border guards are using their database access appropriately, the information in the database is wildly inaccurate and out of date, often resulting in wrongful detention, embarrassing interrogations and searches, or even travel bans.
Despite these enormous problems, we’re still rushing to share even more information between our nations. This week, BCCLA Policy Director Micheal Vonn is off to Ottawa to appear at a parliamentary committee meeting discussing the Passenger Protect Program and plans to bring the U.S. No-Fly List to Canada. We’ll have more on that when she reports back.
“Would you call that an adequate investigation?”
Posted: April 12, 2010 Filed under: Afghan Detainee Hearings, Torture | Tags: afghanistan, canada, detainee hearings, detainees, grace pastine, mpcc, sansterre, Torture Leave a comment »This afternoon at the MPCC Afghanistan Public Interest Hearings, BCCLA Litigation Director Grace Pastine had the opportunity to cross-examine Lieutenant-Colonel Gilles Sansterre, the head investigator at the Canadian Forces National Investigative Service. The CFNIS is responsible for investigating serious offences committed by Canadian Forces personnel.

LCol Sansterre at MPCC
We don’t have a copy of the official transcript yet, but the Canadian Press is reporting the following exchange between Grace and Lt-Col. Sansterre:
Q: “So, in fact, no witnesses were interviewed?”
A: “I can’t say for sure, but certainly by the documents we have, it appears that way.”
Q: “And no evidence was collected?”
A: “Again, it appears that way.”
Q: “In retrospect, would you call that an adequate investigation?”
[After some vacillating . . .]
A: “If it’s just those three pages, certainly I can understand why it would appear that way.”
Importantly, Lt-Col. Sansterre also acknowledged that from an investigative point of view, transfer to torture is illegal conduct.
Up tomorrow before the MPCC — Richard Colvin, whose testimony before Parliament we’ve covered before in these pages.
[UPDATE: Grace Pastine, BCCLA Litigation Director and lawyer working on the Afghan detainee file, was interviewed by Rabble.ca. She discusses the testimony given by LCol Sansterre in some detail. The entire interview is available online.]
The detainee buck stops where?
Posted: March 31, 2010 Filed under: Afghan Detainee Hearings, Torture | Tags: afghanistan, canada, detainee hearings, dfait, documents, Torture 3 Comments »The Afghanistan detainee transfer agreement of May 2007 has been cited by the government as providing for adequate monitoring and inspections of prisoners transferred by Canadian Forces to Afghan authorities. In testimony before the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan, the Hon. Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, cited these inspections as evidence that Canada was doing its best to monitor the treatment of detainees handed over to Afghan authorities, stating that the Canadian system in place since May 2007 is a “model to follow”:
The supplemental arrangement that our government put in place has allowed the implementation of an oversight and follow-up mechanism that ensures protection of the rights of prisoners transferred by Canada and it is considered a model to follow.
This arrangement states that Canadian representatives will have unrestricted access to those prisoners, as my colleague, the Minister of National Defence, Mr. MacKay, mentioned.
This has enabled us to conduct nearly 200 visits, since the implementation of our new agreement, to verify that prisoners who had been transferred were treated in accordance with our values and principles and international law.
At this same session, the Hon. Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence, claimed that Canadian Forces in Afghanistan rely on Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) reports when determining whether or not detainees transferred to Afghan authorities face a risk of torture:
While the commander of Joint Task Force Afghanistan holds the final decision on transfers, his decision is informed by a comprehensive understanding of the circumstances, including information based on the monitoring and the diplomatic analysis of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Neither the Canadian Forces nor the commander make decisions in the abstract.
It turns out that Canadian Forces (CF) were not making decisions in the abstract, but in a vacuum. Documents obtained by the Globe and Mail have revealed that detainee transfers were suspended in November 2007 in significant part because Canadian Forces had insufficient information to allay their concerns, in light of ongoing allegations of detainee abuse by Afghan officials. According to the Globe and Mail‘s account, senior CF command had limited access to reports of any kind — belying the claims made by Cannon and MacKay before the parliamentary committee.
The documents paint a picture of a command struggling to deal with decisions on detainee transfers in an uncertain environment and without the information necessary. Colonel Christian Juneau, Acting Commander of Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, wrote a letter copied to General Rick Hillier, Defence Minister Peter MacKay, and other Canadian officials recommending the suspension of transfers of detainees to Afghan officials in November 2007. Col. Juneau wrote that he had inadequate information to justify continuing transfers.
Later that month, Brigadier General Guy LaRoche, then Commander of the Joint Task Force in Afghanistan, put a moratorium on further transfers to Afghan authorities. The Globe and Mail describes the letter halting transfers:
Brig.-Gen. Laroche in his letter lamented “the fact that meaningful investigation reports into previous abuse allegations have yet to be received.” He said this meant there could be a “larger systemic problem” concerning detainees. “This puts this headquarters and indeed the Canadian Forces, in a difficult position.”
…
The general told his Ottawa masters that it was “essential that an effective, robust and timely mechanism be put in place to deal with new allegations” and explained he was not only halting handovers but putting a moratorium on further transfers until a better reporting system was put into place.
“This can only be accomplished through a meaningful detention facility presence and pro-active … reporting that includes concrete recommendations.”
These reports raise serious concerns about the detainee tracking and monitoring process, even after the new transfer agreement was implemented in May 2007. The new agreement was meant to generate the information needed to make proper decisions on detainee transfers, but the information was not being given to those who needed it most.
UPDATE: Meanwhile, in parliamentary committee today, a diplomat with Foreign Affairs claimed that Canadian Forces were doing nothing to help get the information that Col. Juneau needed. Cory Anderson, a senior DFAIT official, stated that one of the most difficult parts of DFAIT’s role was working with Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS), the notorious Afghan intelligence agency. DFAIT needed help building a relationship with the NDS, but CF would not step in:
The Canadian Forces enjoy an intimate and comprehensive relationship with the National Directorate of Security on a daily basis related to all aspects of military operations and intelligence gathering, but refuse to wade into the one facet of that relationship where adherence to our international obligations is most at risk.
Mr. Anderson criticized the NDS for its “endemic and systemic duplicity … that exists to this day, and renders it virtually impossible to have an open and transparent relationship with their officials on the ground in Kandahar.”
To summarize: CF can’t be responsible for detainee transfers without better reports from DFAIT. DFAIT can’t be responsible for providing accurate reports without more help from CF. These problems still haven’t been resolved, nearly three years after the May 2007 transfer agreement was signed.
CBSA delays laptop search Access to Information request
Posted: February 9, 2010 Filed under: Borders, Laptop Searches, Security | Tags: canada, cbsa, documents, laptops, privacy, Security 1 Comment »The BCCLA has been following reports of searches of laptops, smartphones, and other electronic devices by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) for some time now. We’ve come across a lot of stories (see here, or here, or here for just a few examples) detailing the experiences of travellers who have had their devices searched or detained, and recommendations from business associations and lawyers concerned with securing confidential or privileged information.
What we haven’t come across are official policy statements from the CBSA describing how they deal with electronic devices. The CBSA has no public policy on the search and detention of electronic devices or the copying and retention of data from these devices.
On October 21, 2009, the BCCLA filed an Access to Information request with the CBSA, hoping to clarify CBSA policy on the search of electronic devices. The BCCLA request asked for CBSA records on:
- Policies pertaining to the search and inspection of Electronic Information;
- Statistics on the number and kinds of electronic devices inspected;
- Methods of search and inspection of the contents of electronic devices;
- Training materials on performing inspections of the contents of electronic devices;
- Criteria used to select individuals for device inspection;
- Demographic information on individuals whose devices have been inspected;
- Policies for requesting or demanding passwords to access Electronic Information from individuals at the border;
- Policies for handling a refusal to provide a password to access or decrypt Electronic Information;
- Policies for the copying and retention of Electronic Information;
- Policies for the inspection and retention of confidential or privileged Electronic Information;
- Policies for the distribution of Electronic Information copied from electronic devices to other Government agencies;
- Policies for the destruction of Electronic Information copied from electronic devices; and
- Documents considering the Charter and other legal implications of the search and inspection of the contents of electronic devices.
The CBSA acknowledged that request on November 4, 2009. The Access to Information Act requires a response within 30 days of receiving the request. That response was received on November 30, 2009, when the CBSA notified the BCCLA that an additional 60 days would be required to process the request, as allowed by ss. 9(1)(a) and 9(1)(b) of the Access to Information Act:
9. (1) The head of a government institution may extend the time limit set out in section 7 or subsection 8(1) in respect of a request under this Act for a reasonable period of time, having regard to the circumstances, if(a) the request is for a large number of records or necessitates a search through a large number of records and meeting the original time limit would unreasonably interfere with the operations of the government institution,(b) consultations are necessary to comply with the request that cannot reasonably be completed within the original time limit, or …
That time extension made the new deadline for response February 1, 2010, 60 days after the initial deadline. We filed a time extension complaint with the Information Commissioner, then waited patiently to see what would come.
February 1 came and went with no response. We waited another week to see if Canada Post was the problem. Still no response. Three months after the original request was filed, the CBSA remains unwilling or unable to provide a single document in response to our request.
What now? To start with, we will amend our complaint with the Information Commissioner to reflect the continued failure of the CBSA to meet its obligations under the Access to Information Act.
In the coming weeks, we’ll post more about the work we’ve done on border searches of personal electronics, including why searches of electronic devices should matter to Canadians, and what we do know about CBSA policy. Once we get some documents from the CBSA, we’ll post those too.
Laptop search documents:
- October 21, 2009 - BCCLA’s Access to Information request
- November 4, 2009 - CBSA acknowledgement of BCCLA’s request
- November 30, 2009 - CBSA notification to BCCLA of 60-day time extension
Khadr decision: what it means
Posted: January 29, 2010 Filed under: GTMO | Tags: afghanistan, canada, GTMO, guantanamo, khadr, scc 2 Comments »Today the Supreme Court of Canada issued its decision in Prime Minister of Canada, et al. v. Omar Ahmed Khadr. The practical outcome is that, for now, the government does not have to ask for the return of Guantanamo detainee and alleged child soldier Omar Khadr. The decision turned on a procedural point about the authority of the court in governmental affairs: the court could not order the government to ask for Mr. Khadr’s return as such an order would interfere with foreign affairs, the exclusive territory of the executive branch of government.
The government may have won that procedural battle, but it appears to be losing the substantive war. The Government of Canada lost on several critical points, and may face further court direction if it does not take appropriate actions to remedy Canada’s violation of Mr. Khadr’s Charter rights. The Supreme Court found that Canadian officials violated Mr. Khadr’s rights and that the remedy of asking for Mr. Khadr’s repatriation is sufficiently connected to that violation.
Here’s a breakdown of what happened:
The Charter applies in this case
Generally, Canadians abroad are governed by the laws of the country hosting them, not by Canadian law. However, there are exceptions to this general rule. The Court sets these out in its judgment:
[14] As a general rule, Canadians abroad are bound by the law of the country in which they find themselves and cannot avail themselves of their rights under the Charter. International customary law and the principle of comity of nations generally prevent the Charter from applying to the actions of Canadian officials operating outside of Canada: R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, at para. 48, per LeBel J., citing United States of America v. Dynar, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 461, at para. 123. The jurisprudence leaves the door open to an exception in the case of Canadian participation in activities of a foreign state or its agents that are contrary to Canada’s international obligations or fundamental human rights norms: Hape, at para. 52, per LeBel J.; Khadr 2008, at para. 18.
In its 2008 decision on Mr. Khadr, the Supreme Court stated that “the principles of international law and comity that might otherwise preclude application of the Charter to Canadian officials acting abroad do not apply to the assistance they gave to U.S. authorities at Guantanamo Bay.” The Court reiterated this reasoning in its latest decision:
[18] Though the process to which Mr. Khadr is subject has changed, his claim is based upon the same underlying series of events at Guantanamo Bay (the interviews and evidence-sharing of 2003 and 2004) that we considered in Khadr 2008. We are satisfied that the rationale in Khadr 2008 for applying the Charter to the actions of Canadian officials at Guantanamo Bay governs this case as well.
Canada violated Mr. Khadr’s Charter rights

Omar Khadr being interrogated at GTMO by two Canadian officials while a CIA agent supervises. This photo was released by Khadr's lawyers. Photo: Wikimedia.
To establish that Canada had violated Mr. Khadr’s section 7 rights to liberty and security of the person, Mr. Khadr had to prove two things:
- That Canada’s actions “contributed to his past and continuing deprivation of liberty” (para. 19); and
- That the “deprivation is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice” (para. 22).
In addressing these two questions, the Court looked to the role Canada played in Mr. Khadr’s detention. It addressed the repeated interrogations by CSIS officers in February and September 2003, the use of the information collected in criminal proceedings against Mr. Khadr, and the fact that Canada knew that Mr. Khadr had been a part of the “frequent flyer program” (a systematic sleep deprivation technique designed to make detainees “more compliant and break down their resistance to interrogation” (para. 24, citing Jawad)) at the time of his CSIS interrogations. The Court also considered Mr. Khadr’s age and the fact that he was not provided access to counsel at the time of the CSIS interrogations.
The Court found that both conditions were met, and that Canada had violated the section 7 rights of Mr. Khadr:
[21] An applicant for a Charter remedy must prove a Charter violation on a balance of probabilities (R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at p. 277). It is reasonable to infer from the uncontradicted evidence before us that the statements taken by Canadian officials are contributing to the continued detention of Mr. Khadr, thereby impacting his liberty and security interests. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary (or disclaimer rebutting this inference), we conclude on the record before us that Canada’s active participation in what was at the time an illegal regime has contributed and continues to contribute to Mr. Khadr’s current detention, which is the subject of his current claim. The causal connection demanded by Suresh between Canadian conduct and the deprivation of liberty and security of person is established.
…
[25] This conduct establishes Canadian participation in state conduct that violates the principles of fundamental justice. Interrogation of a youth, to elicit statements about the most serious criminal charges while detained in these conditions and without access to counsel, and while knowing that the fruits of the interrogations would be shared with the U.S. prosecutors, offends the most basic Canadian standards about the treatment of detained youth suspects.
Asking for Mr. Khadr’s return would be “appropriate and just”
When crafting Charter remedies, the judiciary has great discretion to come up with a remedy that addresses the unique circumstances of the Charter violation being addressed. While the remedy of an order to seek the return of an individual being held abroad is unusual, usual-ness is not the standard by which Charter remedies are judged. Remedies must be “appropriate and just”, responding to the violation in a way that “meaningfully vindicates the rights and freedoms of the claimants” (Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia at para. 55).
The Court considered whether there was a “sufficient connection ” between the breach of Mr. Khadr’s Charter rights and the remedy sought. The remedy sought is unusual, but so are the circumstances of Mr. Khadr’s ongoing detention. The Supreme Court found that the ongoing consequences of the Charter breach means that a request to have Mr. Khadr turned over to Canadian custody would potentially vindicate those rights:
In our view, the sufficiency of this connection is established by the continuing effect of these breaches into the present. Mr. Khadr’s Charter rights were breached when Canadian officials contributed to his detention by virtue of their interrogations at Guantanamo Bay knowing Mr. Khadr was a youth, did not have access to legal counsel or habeas corpus at that time and, at the time of the interview in March 2004, had been subjected to improper treatment by the U.S. authorities. As the information obtained by Canadian officials during the course of their interrogations may be used in the U.S. proceedings against Mr. Khadr, the effect of the breaches cannot be said to have been spent. It continues to this day. As discussed earlier, the material that Canadian officials gathered and turned over to the U.S. military authorities may form part of the case upon which he is currently being held. The evidence before us suggests that the material produced was relevant and useful. There has been no suggestion that it does not form part of the case against Mr. Khadr or that it will not be put forward at his ultimate trial. We therefore find that the breach of Mr. Khadr’s s. 7 Charter rights remains ongoing and that the remedy sought could potentially vindicate those rights. (para. 30)
Division of authority
Finally, the Court had to consider whether the order from the Federal Court stepped inappropriately into the territory of the executive branch of government, which has the prerogative in matters of foreign affairs. While courts may exercise oversight, the Supreme Court decided that in this case, the court must defer to the judgment of the executive branch:
[39] Our first concern is that the remedy ordered below gives too little weight to the constitutional responsibility of the executive to make decisions on matters of foreign affairs in the context of complex and ever-changing circumstances, taking into account Canada’s broader national interests. For the following reasons, we conclude that the appropriate remedy is to declare that, on the record before the Court, Canada infringed Mr. Khadr’s s. 7 rights, and to leave it to the government to decide how best to respond to this judgment in light of current information, its responsibility for foreign affairs, and in conformity with the Charter.
The Court stated it would exercise its oversight role with caution, giving the changing circumstances around Mr. Khadr’s detention and eventual trial and the court’s “incomplete picture of the range of considerations currently faced by the government in assessing Mr. Khadr’s request” (para. 44). However, the Court did not close the door completely:
The government must have flexibility in deciding how its duties under the power are to be discharged: see, e.g., Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at paras. 101-2. But it is for the courts to determine the legal and constitutional limits within which such decisions are to be taken. It follows that in the case of refusal by a government to abide by constitutional constraints, courts are empowered to make orders ensuring that the government’s foreign affairs prerogative is exercised in accordance with the constitution: United States v. Burns, 2001 SCC 7, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283. (para. 37).
Conclusion
While it overturned the Federal Court’s order for the government to seek Mr. Khadr’s immediate return, the Supreme Court has not let the government off the hook for Canada’s violations of Mr. Khadr’s Charter rights. The Court has issued “a declaration advising the government of its opinion on the records before it which, in turn, will provide the legal framework for the executive to exercise its functions and to consider what actions to take in respect of Mr. Khadr, in conformity with the Charter” (para. 47). The government must do something to vindicate Mr. Khadr’s Charter rights, and the court has set out requesting his return as an option that would possibly do just that.
Seeing through airport scanner rhetoric
Posted: January 28, 2010 Filed under: Security | Tags: airports, body scanners, bodyscanners, canada, privacy, Security, terrorism 2 Comments »The BCCLA unpacks the Canadian response to the Underwear Bomber, pointing out critical flaws in the body scanning machines that will be appearing in Canadian airports in the near future. This article will break down the BCCLA’s complaints with the scanners, focusing on privacy concerns, weaknesses of the technology, and issues with the lack of public debate before the devices were purchased.
Unless you’ve spent the past month in a media vacuum, you know by now that on December 25, 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab allegedly attempted to blow up an airplane with explosive underpants.
The “Underwear Bomber” has since pleaded not guilty to charges of attempted murder and possession of weapons of mass destruction. For the next few weeks, what Bruce Schneier calls airport security theatre—attempts to do something (anything!) for the sake of being seen to do something—became a theatre of the absurd.
In Canada, carry-ons were banned completely from U.S.-bound flights. Controversies erupted over what exactly could be brought onto a plane and who got to decide. Books were thought to be banned and then promptly unbanned. Travellers were told that they can’t be told what not to bring, because telling them would threaten security. Final decisions on many items not included on “the list” of approved items would be left to the discretion of airport screeners, and might vary based on criteria like the length of the flight.
While the carry-on restrictions and other new rules are both frustrating to travellers and illustrative of the knee-jerk reactions to obscure threats we’ve seen over the past few years (liquid bombers, shoe bombers), they pose few serious concerns for the BCCLA. The real threat to our liberties comes from what is set to be the real legacy of the Underwear Bomber—virtual strip search machines.
The BCCLA has several critical concerns with the scanners:
1. The privacy implications
A. Genital blurring bait-and-switch
When CATSA recommended the scanners for use in Canada in October, 2009 and placed its initial order for 7 of the machines, they were ordered without the ‘genital blurring software’ that had been in place during the Kelowna trial.
The images that have been plastered all over newspapers around the world are an example of what can seen with the genital blurring software enabled. That’s the picture below, center. To the left, you see the cartoony image that will be available to screeners interacting with passengers. To the right, you see what the scanners will see with genital blurring software disabled. These images are far more detailed and far more revealing.
B. Image retention and transmission
Canadians have been assured that the scanners being installed in Canadian airports will delete images after a passenger has passed through security screening, and will not have the capacity to save or send the images they capture. Putting aside the reality that screeners could just take photos of the image on their screen with their own cameras or even their cellphones, claims that the image cannot be saved or sent appear to be false.
Yesterday, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) posted documents it has received as part of a lawsuit involving body scanners. The documents came from the Transportation Security Authority (TSA) in the United States, and detail administrative overrides on the scanning machines that would allow images of passengers to be saved and sent over the internet.
C. Secondary today, primary tomorrow?
One of the lessons of the war on terror has been that technology that is implemented for one purpose will soon be used for another. While Canadians are being promised that the machines will be used only for secondary screening and that concerned individuals can opt for a physical patdown search, how long will it be before we are told that it is necessary for these machines to be used in primary screening and without an option for a patdown?
The push for virtual strip search as primary screening has already begun in the U.S. and in Britain.
In the United States, body scanners are still mostly used as secondary screening, but they are a primary screening device in at least six airports, though patdown searches are also an option.
In Britain, travellers are being told that a random selection of passengers will be sent through the scanners, and they won’t have the option for a patdown instead:
Airline passengers will have no right to refuse to go through a full-body search scanner when the devices are introduced at Heathrow airport next week, ministers have confirmed.
The option of having a full-body pat-down search instead, offered to passengers at US airports, will not be available despite warnings from the government’s Equality and Human Rights Commission that the scanners, which reveal naked bodies, breach privacy rules under the Human Rights Act.
D. The patdown option
While some people say that they would prefer a body scan to a patdown search, the assured pressure to make scans more prevalent will disproportionately impact people whose religious beliefs include maintaining bodily modesty and people who have a profound dignity interest in preventing various items from being viewed, including those wearing incontinence garments, sanitary napkins, colostomy equipment, and so on.
E. Won’t someone think of the children?
In one of the more bizarre twists of the body scanner saga, concerns have been raised in the United Kingdom that scanned images of people under the age of 18 may run afoul of Britain’s child pornography laws:
A 12-month trial at Manchester airport of scanners which reveal naked images of passengers including their genitalia and breast enlargements, only went ahead last month after under-18s were exempted.
The decision followed a warning from Terri Dowty, of Action for Rights of Children, that the scanners could breach the Protection of Children Act 1978, under which it is illegal to create an indecent image or a “pseudo-image” of a child.
In Canada, minors have also been exempted, but this raises entirely new questions. How effective can the machines be if people under the age of 18 aren’t being screened?
2. The technology
A. Effectiveness
The BCCLA wholeheartedly agrees that security measures are necessary to make sure air travel is safe. However, it appears that the scanners being rushed into operation in Canada would not have detected the Underwear Bomber’s bomb, and in fact have difficulty detecting much that would not be detected by a metal detector. To quote security expert Bruce Schneier, body scanners are “not just a dumb idea, they don’t actually work.”
The failings of the body scanning technologies have been pointed out many times, including on this German TV clip showing a man bringing bomb making supplies through a scanner:
All varieties of body scanners available are good at picking up dense items, like metal or thick plastic, but looser items—powder, gels, or thin layers of plastic—are as invisible as your clothing. A 2007 report from the Committee on Assessment of Security Technologies for Transportation of the U.S. National Research Council found that “there is insufficient technology available to develop a system capable of identifying concealed explosives”, and recommended continued research before the systems are implemented.
Similar results have come out of the UK:
Yesterday, the London Independent reported on “authoritative claims that officials at the [UK] Department for Transport and the Home Office have already tested the scanners and were not persuaded that they would work comprehensively against terrorist threats to aviation.” A British defense-research firm reportedly found the machines unreliable in detecting “low-density” materials like plastics, chemicals, and liquids—precisely what the underwear bomber had stuffed in his briefs.
Even if the systems could detect explosives secreted on the surface of the body, they are not foolproof. They could not detect anything between folds of flesh or inside body cavities. Are cavity scans just around the corner?
B. Efficiency
The Kelowna trial also showed that the scanners would further slow the lines at airport security, processing people at only a fraction of the speed. Efficiency cannot be the deciding factor in what security measures are appropriate for airports, but when combined with the ineffectiveness, privacy concerns, and cost of the full body scanners purchased by CATSA, the additional time spent screening passengers is not worth it.
C. Health concerns
There are many health questions being raised around full body imaging systems, and the only definitive answer so far seems to be “we don’t know yet.” In all likelihood, the machines are safe. The American College of Radiation and American Roentgen Ray Society have both said they are not concerned by the technology. All the same, long term studies on the safety of millimeter wave technology have not been conducted, and the health impact on sensitive individuals—pregnant women, for instance—is still unclear.
3. The process
A. Lack of debate
The BCCLA has been monitoring the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority’s (CATSA) efforts to get the machines approved for and installed in Canadian airports for some time now. From June 2008 through January 2009, the machines were put through a trial at Kelowna International Airport in BC. The trial was cursory at best, designed to gauge passenger acceptance and not test the efficacy of the machines. Based on those results, the machines were recommended by CATSA in September 2009, and seven were ordered before they had even been approved by the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. Finally, the machines were given approval by Canada’s Deputy Privacy Commissioner, Chantal Bernier, in October 2009.

On January 5th, Transport Minister John Baird announced that Canada will be installing 44 “body scanners”, virtual strip search machines that see through travellers’ clothing to reveal items concealed beneath. The first 12 of the scanners arrived in Canadian airports the week after.
On January 13th, Minister Baird claimed that the machines had been ordered months ago, and stressed the need to act immediately. “We’re taking the leadership in this. We have to move quickly and expeditiously.”
It’s very hard for politicians to say no to heightened security. They have to be seen to do something to respond to an attack, even if, as is the case with body scanners, that response wouldn’t have prevented the attack being responded to.
This type of security logic is badly broken. It amounts to an arms race, where security is geared toward the last attack that was tried, completely ignoring what might be tried in the future. Baird himself highlighted this issue, saying that, “We’ve always got to be raising our game, because the terrorists are always going to be changing theirs.” We’ve been “raising our game” ever since 2001; the benefits for safety are dubious and the cost to liberties has been high.
Ironically, the best security fixes since 2001 are incredibly non-intrusive, adapt to nearly every possible in-air terror plot, and costs the government next to nothing. Cockpit doors have been secured, and passengers now know they have to fight back. That knowledge—not shoe removal or naked scans—is what kept the shoe and underpants plots from being successful.
We need to sit back and think about that simple fix. We need to think about the real risks of terrorism and debate what measures are sensible to take to prevent it. The worst time to make decisions like that is in the emotional moments after an attack, yet we continue to do just that.
B. The body scan lobby
Michael Chertoff, founder of the Chertoff Group of security consultants and former head of the Department of Homeland Security, has been making the rounds on cable news promoting the use of body scanners in the wake of the attack. It was recently revealed in the Washington Post that Rapiscan, one of the manufacturers of body scanners, is a client of Chertoff’s company.
The conflict of interest apparent in the U.S. body scan lobby has made a difference in Canada, as well. The TSA’s assessment of body scanners weighed heavily in Minister Baird’s decision:
“We’re confident that these are the best machines available on the market and they are the only ones recognized by the (U.S.) Transportation Security Administration, so that was an important part of our decision.”
C. A better way
Where is the way forward on body scanners? There are several options.
The best option would be to hold off until the technology has improved, but that ship has sailed. If the scanners are deemed a necessity, there are options that are no more expensive, no less effective, and better at protecting privacy than the L-3 machines purchased by CATSA.
Some systems have a “privacy mode” that only show cartoon-like images of the body, highlighting areas where suspicious items are detected in red. There are also millimeter wave scanners that operate on exactly the same principles as the L-3 scanners, but do not generate images at all. Much like the metal detectors currently used in airports, these machines will sound an alarm if suspicious items are detected, and the individual who triggers the alarm can be searched physically.










